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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether a written option, as extended, could be specifically 
enforced, despite failure to pay the consideration therefor recited 
therein, and following withdrawal of the option prior to the attempt 
to exercise it. 
2. Whether parol evidence was admissible to show that the 
consideration expressed in the written option was not intended to be 
paid, rather that the subject matter of separate written purchase 
agreements, complete in themselves, was intended to include considera-
tion for the option. 
3. Whether the District Courts1 admission of fragmentary, unin-
telligible documents for the purpose of determining the credibility of 
a central witness was reversible error. 
4. Whether the admission, and application to the central ques-
tion of the value of optioned land, of an appraisal shown to have been 
based upon a substantial error as to zoning, was reversible error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of an extension of an 
option to buy land, as assigned. The District Court ordered specific 
performance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In Fall, 1981, a period of high inflation and falling land val-
ues, William Colman approached appellants John Archer and Elliott 
Wolfe seeking a loan of money with which to finance Colmanfs mineral 
project at Carson Sinks, Nevada. Archer and Wolfe refused, because of 
1 
adverse tax consequences, to make a loan. Findings Nos. 4, 5; Tria 
transcript Volume III, p. 417, Vol. V, pp. 731-732, Vol. IV, pp. 53 
537. After discussion and review of reports indicating the great 
potential value of the project, however, Archer and Wolfe agreed to 
purchase a limited partnership interest in the project for 
$250,000.00, upon condition that the purchase be structured to prov 
certain tax advantages and an over-riding royalty on the project. 
Vol. Ill, p. 419 et seq., Vol. V, p. 731 et seq., Vol. I, p. 10 et 
seq., Vol. IV, p. 537. 
As Colman needed a larger sum of money, he offered also to sel 
Archer and Wolfe a property known as the Anderson Ranch in Cache 
County, Utah. Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 423-425, Vol. V, p. 734, Vol. IV, j 
539. After discussion and investigation of values and opportunities 
to sell, Colman agreed to sell and Archer and Wolfe agreed to buy tl 
ranch for $250,000.00. Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 424-425, 428, Vol. V, pp. 
734-740, Vol. IV, p. 239 et seq. It was agreed that the purchasers 
would be the Archer and Wolfe family trusts. See Exhibit 4, Agreerm 
for Purchase of Real Property. 
Colman thereafter sought an option to re-purchase the ranch aft 
one year. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 430 et seq., Vol. I, pp. 739, 746, Vol. 
IV, p. 541. Appellants agreed upon condition that the option be dat 
some time ('March 1, 1982) after the ranch purchase closing (January 
1982), to avoid any impression that the transaction was intended as 
loan (which would have resulted in ordinary income treatment, rathei 
than capital gains treatment of any proceeds of any sale). Tr. Vol. 
V, pp. 764-765. 
Written documents for these transactions were then prepared: a 
Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership, purchasing an inte 
2 
est in the Carson Sink project for $250,000.00, an Agreement for Pur-
chase of Real Property, to purchase the ranch for $250,000.00, and a 
one-year Option. See Exhibits 3, 4, Tr. Vol. I, II, pp. 137, 152. 
Archer, Wolfe, and Colman testify that these documents were separately 
prepared and executed at different times, as the dates affixed to them 
show. Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 437, 439, 441, 455, 459, Vol IV, pp. 547, 549, 
555 et seq., Vol. V, pp. 749, 751, 753, et seq. This testimony is 
disputed by the attorney who drafted the papers. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 65-66. 
Sometime thereafter, Colman sought an extension of the option 
period to 18 months. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 563, 564, Vol III, p. 449, et 
seq., Vol. V, p. 760, et seq. Appellants agreed to provide the exten-
sion. Appellants and Colman assert that appellants1 price for holding 
the property at Colman1s disposal another 6 months was $5,000.00, and 
the extended option was made to recite that it was given in considera-
tion of "$5000 and other good and valuable consideration." Tr. Vol. 
Ill, p. 449 et seq., Vol IV, p. 563, et seq., Vol. V, p. 760 et seq. 
Copies of the pertinent documents - the Certificate and Agreement 
of Limited Partnership, the Agreement for Purchase of Real Property, 
and the 18 month Option - are attached hereto as Appendix 1. 
The Option was drawn for the signatures of all of the trustees of 
the Archer and Wolfe trusts: John Archer, Elizabeth Archer, Elliott 
Wolfe, Hubert Wolfe, and Judy Wolfe. Only the signatures of John and 
Elizabeth Archer and Elliott Wolfe were ever affixed. See Exhibit 8. 
A copy of the partially executed Option was given to Colman upon 
delivery of deeds to the ranch, January 4, 1982. Tr. Vol. Ill, 
p. 458. Colman did not then pay the $5,000.00 for the Option (Tr. 
Vol. Ill, p. 465, Vol. IV, p. 571), or attempt to record the Option, 
Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 402-403. 
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Beginning in March, 1982, appellants made repeated demands on 
Colman for the $5000.00, but he never paid it because he didn't the 
have the money. Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 467-474, Vol. IV, pp. 574-589, V 
V., pp. 768-770. Finally, appellants advised Colman that the optio 
would be regarded as invalid if the $5000.00 was not paid. Tr. Vol 
IV, p. 589. 
When appellants subsequently received notice that Colman had 
assigned the option to respondent, appellants notified respondent t 
the option had not been paid for. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 311, 312. Appe 
lants agreed to sell the land to respondent for the $650,000.00 pri 
plus the $5000.00 option price. At first, respondent agreed, but t 
declined. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 319, 321. Appellants then notified re-
spondent in writing that the consideration for the option had never 
been paid, and that the option, to the extent it was not void, was 
withdrawn. Tr. Vol. II, p. 322, Exhibit 50. 
This action for specific performance of the option followed. 
Prior to admission of any of the relevant documents, without 
making a determination that the documents in issue were in any sens 
ambiguous or subject to explanation, and without any claim that fra 
or mistake was in any sense involved, the District Court, over appe 
lants1 repeated objections, admitted all evidence proffered regardi 
the preliminary discussions surrounding preparation of the document 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 51-52, 58-61, Vol. Ill, p. 463, Vol. IV, pp. 524-
525), for the purpose of determining the "real" nature of the trans 
tions. Generally, this evidence consisted of the testimony of the 
lawyer who prepared the documents, who testified that he took no pa 
in the negotiation of the documents (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 43, 93-95), di 
not know whether he had ever received any instructions about the 
4 
documents from appellants (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 44-45, 49, 63), and had 
never had communication with any party regarding the $5,000.00 figure 
recited in the Option (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 154-155), but that he regarded 
the transactions between Colman and appellants as a loan. Eventually, 
the District Court determined that the transactions between appellants 
and Colman were "the functional equivalent of a loan" of $500,000.00, 
at 20% simple interest, for 18 months, secured by the Anderson Ranch, 
in which the consideration for granting the option was the sale of the 
limited partnership interest and the ranch. Findings Nos. 21, 30. 
Therefore, the District Court ruled, the $5000 recited in the option 
was an empty phrase, and need never have been paid. Id. The District 
Court granted specific performance of the option. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Decision of this case required construction of documents clear 
and unambiguous on their face: an agreement to purchase a limited 
partnership interest for a fixed price; an agreement to purchase land 
for a fixed price; a one-year option to re-purchase the land for a 
fixed price, subsequently extended to 18 months upon consideration of 
$5000.00. It was never claimed, and the District Court never found, 
that the documents were in any sense ambiguous, or their meaning 
unclear. 
The purpose of the form of the documents, dictated by appellants, 
was admittedly specific tax benefits expected to follow thereform; the 
transactions admittedly would not have been entered into by appellants 
except in such form. 
Based upon the testimony of the attorney for seller in the trans-
actions that, though he had participated in none of the negotiations 
5 
for the transactions and had never discussed the consideration for 
option with any party, he regarded the transactions as constituting 
loan secured by the realty, in which the $5,000.00 recited in the 
option was not intended to be paid, and even though that theory COL 
not account for the conveyance of the valuable limited partnership 
interest, the District Court found: (1) that the transactions cons 
tuted a secured loan; (2) that the consideration for the option was 
the sale of the limited partnership interest, the sale of the land, 
and the price to be paid for the land; and (3) that the $5000.00 
recited in the option was never intended to be paid. 
The District Court's ruling violated the parole evidence rule 
that it varied the plain terms of the documents. 
The admission of parole was not justified by an inquiry into t 
consideration for the option, because it varied the contractual con 
siderations stated in the limited partnership and land sale agree-
ments, altered the subject matter of these agreements, and eradicat 
the legal effect of the agreements, namely, the tax structure for 
which they had been entered into. 
The admission of parol in variance of the terms of the documen 
was not justified by the rule allowing a showing that apparently 
separate documents are integrated, since that rule does not permit 
variance of the terms of the documents. 
4 The admission of parol was not justified by an attempt to show 
that the absolute conveyance of the land was intended as a mortgage 
security. The evidence in that regard was not clear and convincing 
and did not purport to show that appellants regarded the transactio 
as anything but a sale and option. 
The judgment was also reversible because based unon evidence 
6 
inadmissible upon other grounds, namely, unintelligible fragments of 
handwritten notes upon which the District Court based its view of the 
credibility of a central witness, and an appraisal of the value of the 
subject land shown to have been based on a fundamental error regarding 
the zoning of the land. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The option attempted to be exercised was not supported by con-
sideration, and had been withdrawn. 
A. An option, not supported by separate consideration agreed 
upon by the parties, is merely an offer subject to withdrawal by the 
optioner at any time before acceptance creates a contract. 
An option is not a contract. Catmull v. Johnson, 541 P.2d 793 
(Utah, 1975). It is in the nature of a continuing offer. Unless 
something of value is given to keep the offer open for a particular 
time, it may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. Fitzgerald 
v. Boyle, 193 Pac. 1109 (Utah, 1920). 
The consideration for an option, like the consideration for any 
other contractual benefit, in what the parties agree shall be exchang-
ed for it. 
The District Court found that the consideration for the option in 
this case was the sale of the ranch and the limited partnership inter-
est. Finding No. 21.— There are two fundamental errors in this find-
ing: 
The finding throws in for good measure the price to be paid for 
the land. The consideration for an option, however, must be 
apart from the consideration to be paid for the land. See C.C. 
Slaughter Cattle Co. v. Potter County, 235 SW 295 (Tex. Cir. App. 
1921), aff'd 254 SW 775 (1923). 
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1. It is unsupported by any admissible evidence (see the 
discussion of parol evidence infra). 
2. It accounts, at most, for a one year option. 
**• The extension of an option, if it shall not be subject tc 
withdrawal at any time before acceptance, must be supported by 
separate, additional consideration. 
The extension of an option is a separate offer. It may be wit 
drawn at any time before acceptance, unless a separate and addition 
consideration is given for it. Coleman v. Applegarth, 11 A. 284 {K 
1887); Franck v. Seavey Mfg. Co. , 153 N.E. 209 (Ohio, 1926); Gambi.1 
v. Snow, 189 S.W. 2d 33 (Tex. App. 1945); Cummins v. Beavers, 48 S. 
891 (Va. 1904); Ide y^_ Leiser, 24 P.695 (Mont. 1890). The law in t 
regard is not different from the law regarding new consideration fo 
any addition to an existing agreement. E.g., Liberty Mut. Fire Ins 
Co. v. Hubbard, 551 P.2d 288 (Ore. 1976); Rossellini v. Banchero, 5 
P.2d 955 (Wash. 1974); PLC Landscape Construction v. Picadilly Fish 
Chips, 502 P.2d 562 (Utah, 1972). 
The agreement to sell the limited partnership interest and the 
agreement to sell the ranch were admittedly reached before the one 
year option was requested and agreed upon. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 430, V 
IV, p. 554, Vol. V, p. 746. Documents constituting the limited par 
nership purchase, the ranch purchase, and the one year option were 
produced and approved. Tr. Vol. I, II, pp. 137, 152. There is no 
dispute that an agreement for a one year option existed following t 
agreements for purchase of the land and the limited partnership. T. 
Vol. I, II, pp. 137, 152-153, Vol. IV, pp. 554. If the ranch and 
limited partnership sales were consideration for an option, it was -
one year option. 
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Some months later, because his expectations of permanent financ-
ing on his project had been delayed, Colman sought an extension of the 
option to 18 months. Tr. Vol. I, p. 137, Vol. IV, pp. 563-564. 
Appellants say they demanded $5,000.00 to hold the property at Col-
man's disposal a further 6 months, and that the $5,000.00 was never 
paid. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 449 et seq., Vol. IV, p. 563, et seq., Vol. I, 
p. 760 et seq. Respondent says that appellants demanded and accepted 
nothing: the consideration for the \\ year option was the same as the 
consideration for the one year option first agreed upon. Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 151-154. 
Regardless of which claim the Court accepts, the result is the 
same: no separate or additional consideration was given for the six 
month extension of the option. The one year option ran before any 
attempt to exercise it. The only attempt to exercise came on the last 
day of the 18 month option, two months after the offer had been 
withdrawn. 
II. Parol evidence was inadmissible to vary the terms of the written 
documents. 
A. A written agreement, apparently complete and certain, will 
be conclusively presumed to contain the whole agreement of the parties 
on the subject matter. B.T. Moran, Inc. vs. First Security Corp., 
28 U. 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933). 
The pertinent documents in this case, the Certificate and Agree-
ment of Limited Partnership, Agreement for Purchase of Real Property, 
and Option, are complete on their face, straightforward and clear. 
There is no ambiguity in them which invites interpretation via parol. 
Indeed, the District Court in this case never determined that the 
documents were anything but complete and clear, or even entertained 
question to that effect. Parol evidence should not be admitted unl 
the court first finds that the documents are in some sense ambiguou 
Winegar v. Smith Inv. Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Utah, 1979); Big Butte 
Ranch, Inc. v^ Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah, 1977). 
**• Where the documents are complete and clear, evidence that 
the parties intended by them any effect except what appears from th 
face is inadmissible. Foxfilm Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 d. 27 
17 P.2d 294 (1932); Last Chance Ranch v. Erickson, 82 d. 475, 25 P. 
952 (1933). The parol evidence rule as codified in Utah (§78-25-16 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) (Supp. 1983)) is as follows: 
§78-25-16. Parol evidence of contents of writings - When 
admissible. 
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, ot 
than the writing itself, except in the following cases: 
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed, in whi 
case proof of the loss or destruction must first be made. 
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party 
against whom the evidence is offered and he fails to produce i 
after reasonable notice. 
(3) When the original is a record or other document in t 
custody of a public officer. 
(4) When the original has been recorded, and the record 
a certificied copy thereof is made evidence by this code or ot 
statute. 
(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts or 
other documents which cannot be examined in court without grea 
loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the 
general result of the whole. 
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member o 
profession or calling, or any department or agency of governme 
in the regular course of business or activity has kept or reco 
ed any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or coi 
bination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurence or event, 
and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of 
same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photograph^* ~ , 
photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, or 
other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable 
medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be 
destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preserv, 
tion is required by law; and such reproduction, when satisfac-
torily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the origina 
itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether th< 
original is in existence or not, an enlargement or facsimile o 
such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the 
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original reproduction is in existence and available for inspec-
tion under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced 
record, enlargement or facsimile, does not preclude admission of 
the original. 
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3) and (4), a copy 
of the original, or of the record, must be produced; in those 
mentioned in subdivisions (1) and (2), either a copy or oral 
evidence of the contents. 
No one asserts that any of the statutory exceptions to the rule are 
applicable in this case. 
The Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership in this case 
provides simply that for $250,000.00, to be paid at the times set out, 
the limited partners will receive specific royalties on production 
from specific properties, together with a commitment to spend the 
money on specific categories of costs. The document is a simple 
equation in which specific considerations are exchanged. The subject 
matter of the purchase and sale, as well as the price, are set out 
unequivocally. 
The same is true of the Agreement for the Purchase of Real Pro-
perty: under it a specific property will pass upon payment of a 
particular price. 
The Option is equally simple and clear; it is a straightforward 
promise to hold the land available for sale at a price in return for 
payment of a specific sum of money. 
The judgment in this case plainly varies the terms of the written 
documents. It cancels the consideration recited in the Option. Find-
ings Nos. 20, 21. To provide consideration for the option, it draws 
from the subject matter of the Certificate and Agreement of Limited 
Partnership and Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property, by alter-
ing the exchanges recited there. It alters the dates of all the 
pertinent documents. It eradicates the tax structure which all parti-
cipants in the transactions testified was the essential basis upon 
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which the investments were made. Findings Nos. 30, 31.— The trans 
tions involved cease to be carefully structured sales of a limited 
partnership interest and land, with a separately justifiable option 
and become "the functional equivalent of a secured loan." Unless s 
exception can be found for it, the judgment in this case violates t 
parol evidence rule and must be reversed. 
The District Court's ruling contains remarks which suggest tha 
the District Court believed that tax structures, notwithstandi 
they may be very valuable and may have been openly bargained f 
and agreed upon, are somehow unreal, or insubstantial, or even 
improper, and can't be the "real" basis for enforceable transa 
tions. See Findings Nos. 7, 8. 
The uncontradicted testimony of all witnesses to the tran 
actions in this case (Archer, Wolfe, Colman, Allen) is that 
appellants insisted upon the structure set forth in the pertin 
documents for tax purposes, and refused to consumate the trans 
tions as the "loan" found by the District Court, and that apel 
lants had the entirely superior bargaining position: the tran, 
actions could not have been done except upon appellants1 terms 
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 45, 95-96, 111, Vol. II, pp. 381-386, 419, 435 
Vol. IV, pp. 537-542, 570, Vol. I, pp. 731-732, 740-744, Vol. 
pp. 9-12. The documents were drawn in the form in which they 
appear because appellants insisted upon it, and Colman conceed< 
Allen admitted that the transactions were not a loan. Tr. Vol 
I, p. 111. 
Respondents1 tax expert testified that the tax structure i 
very valuable, that he could find nothing improper in it, and 
that he would not have done the transactions differently. Tr. 
Vol. Ill, pp. 371-386, Exhibit 11. 
The fact that the transactions in this case may have had • 
same effect for Colman as obtaining $500,000.00 for lh years a-
20% simple interest on security of the Anderson Ranch - at leai 
if one wholly ignores the substantial value of the limited par1 
nership interest also conveyed - does not permit the court to 
ignore the specific structure written into the transactions, ii 
violation of the parol evidence rule, on the ground that the 
structure was intended to obtain mere tax advantages. 
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III. No exception to the parol evidence rule exists for the District 
Court's ruling. 
A. Generally, recitals in a written instrument as to considera-
tion are not conclusive, and it is competent to inquire into the 
consideration and show by parol evidence what the true consideration 
was, Neilsen v^ MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah, 1982); Wood v. 
Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1978). 
This rule is applicable, however, only provided that 
(1) such evidence does not destroy the legal effect of the 
instrument, or 
(2) vary its terms, and 
(3) the recital is not contractual in nature. Id., Paccagnini 
v. Bort, 190 N.E. 2d 493 (111. Apps. 1963); Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d 
563 (Utah, 1941). 
The District Court in this case found that the consideration for 
the Option was not the "$5000.00 and other good and valuable consider-
ation" recited in it, but the subject matters of the Certificate and 
Agreement of Limited Partnership and the Agreement for the Purchase of 
Real Property, namely, the sale of the limited partnership interest 
and the sale of the ranch. The basis for this conclusion was the 
testimony of Frank Allen regarding supposed remarks of the parties in 
the process of preparing the documents, an "affidavit" of Colman 
prepared by Allen after the fact, and certain fragments of "notes" 
written by Colman of conversations with unidentified persons after the 
fact. All of this evidence was, of course, parol. 
If the basis claimed for this resort to parol is an examination 
into the consideration for the Option, it was inadequate, because the 
District Court's ruling requires, as well, the alteration of the sub-
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ject matters of the limited partnership and land purchase agreemeni 
the variation of the plainly contractual provisions regarding cons; 
eration in these agreements, and destruction of the legal effect oj 
all three documents. 
i. The District Court's reconstruction alters the subject 
matter of the limited partnership and land purchase 
agreements. 
In the District Courtfs reconstruction of the transactions be-
tween Colman and appellants, the subject matter of the Certificate 
Agreement of Limited Partnership ceases to be the exchange of a lin 
ed partnership interest for payments of money. The money under the 
agreement, according to the District Court, passes as a loan, upon 
(implied?) promise to repay or convey the Anderson Ranch. The limi 
partnership interest, therefore, passess without consideration, or 
3 
upon some unexpressed consideration.— The effect of this intrepret 
tion of the document obviously alters the subject matter entirely. 
Possibly/ the District Court regarded the limited partnership 
interest as insubstantial. Possibly, the District Court belie 
that a real transfer of a valuable interest was not intended, 
fact, the undisputed testimony was that the royalties obtained 
the limited partners were worth a very substantial amount of 
money (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 47, 117 et seq., Vol. IV, pp. 527-528, 
637-638), potentially much more than the Anderson Ranch. Resp 
dent's witness Allen testified that the royalties alone justif 
the sum paid for the limited partnership interest (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 119, 121-122), and that the value of the limited partnersh 
interests simply couldn!t be accounted for on the theory that 
transactions constituted a secured loan. Indeed, so great was 
the potential value of the royalties that Allen tried very har 
to dissuade Colman from transferring them (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 118 
et seq.). The latter testimony demonstrates that Allen certai 
believed that the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partner 
ship entitled Archer and Wolfe to transfer of the royalites; a 
there is no question that the document has that effect on its 
face. It is true, as the District Court noted, that, at the t 
of trial, four years after execution of the agreement, no assi 
ment of the royalties to appellants had occurred. The Distric 
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The subject of the Agreement to Purchase Real Estate, under the 
District Court's ruling, is not a promise to convey the Anderson 
Ranch, but an implied promise to repay the $250,000.00 required 
thereunder. Again, the subject matter of the agreement has been 
altered. 
It is not permissible, under the guise of proving by parol the 
consideration of a written contract, to add to or take from the other 
provisions of an instrument, to modify or impair the operative effect 
thereof, to defeat the agreement, or wipe out its essential terms, or 
to change its subject matter. E.g., Tarr v. Hicks, 393 P.2d 557 
(Colo., 1964); Kane v. Union State Bank, 384 S.W. 2d 358 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1964): Johnson v. Johnson, 178 S.W. 3d 983 (Ky. 1944); 30 Am. 
Jur. 2d Evidence, §1056. 
ii. The consideration expressed in the limited part-
nership and land purchase agreements are contractual, and 
may not be varied by parol. 
By the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership, appel-
lants Archer and Wolfe promised to make certain payments over time and 
Owanah Oil Company promised to convey certain interests in the Carson 
Sink project, including royalties, and to expend the sums received on 
certain categories of costs. By the Agreement to Purchase Real Es-
tate, the Archer and Wolfe trusts promised to pay a sum of money, and 
Royalty Investment Company promised to convey a property. 
Whatever argument might be made that the consideration recited in 
Court failed to note, however, that no assignment was due for 
three years under the terms of the document, that the litigation 
had occupied the period after the assignment was first due, and 
that the assignment had been demanded by appellants but not 
received. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 519. 
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the Option is not contractual, the consideration stated in the limi 
partnership and land purchase agreements are obviously contractual, 
and it is not competent to attempt to vary them by parol. See Palo 
v. Beebe, supra; Wood v. Roberts, supra, Paccagnini v. Bort, supra. 
It is not permissible to attempt to show that the consideration for 
the limited partnership interests was not the money expressed in th 
agreement, and vice versa. It is not permissible to attempt to sho 
that the consideration for the land was not the money, and vice ver 
That is to say, it was not permissible to attempt to show that any 
considerations expressed in these agreements was the consideration 
any further transaction, namely, the option. 
The same result is reached by applying the straightforward ru] 
that where the consideration to be given has been agreed upon, it 
cannot be added to by parol. Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc., v. Sal 
Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1982). The consideration agreed tc 
paid for the limited partnership interest and the land was a total 
$500,000.00, not $500,000.00 plus a 1^ year option on the land. 
iii. The District Court f s reconstruction destroys the 
legal effect of all the pertinent documents. 
All witnesses in this matter testified that the transactions i 
structured in the particular manner shown by the face of the docurm 
to accomplish particular tax objections of the investors, and that 
transactions would not have been entered into otherwise. Tr. Vol. 
pp. 45, 95-96, 111, Vol. Ill, pp. 381-386, 419, 435, Vol. IV, pp. 
542, 570, Vol. V, 731-732, 740-744, and see Vol. I, pp. 9-12. If 
limited partnership transaction was a genuine purchase of royaltie 
and related limited partnership rights, with a genuine promise to 
expend sums invested on qualified costs, the investment was entitl 
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to a "research and development" credit against the investors1 taxes. 
If the ranch purchase was a genuine purchase, with a subsequent genu-
ine option supported by real and separate consideration, proceeds of 
the subsequent sale of the property would be entitled to capital gains 
treatment. If, on the other hand, the transaction was, as the Dis-
trict Court found, a secured loan of $500,000.00, no research and 
development credit is available, and any "repayment" of funds is sub-
ject to ordinary income treatment. See the testimony of respondent's 
witness William T. Crosby, Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 371-386, Exhibit 11. 
That is, not only does the District Court's reconstruction of the 
documents alter their legal effect on their face - from purchase to 
loan - it eradicates the legal effects - the tax effects - except for 
which it is admitted the transactions would never have been entered 
into. 
B. Parol evidence is admissible to rebut the presumption that 
separate documents complete on their face are individually integrated. 
Bulfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972). 
Parol evidence may be admitted to show that apparently separate 
documents are interdependent. That is, parol is admissible on the 
question of the intent of the parties that the documents be construed 
together. Id. Respondents1 claim in this case that the transactions 
between appellants and Colman were "integrated" may be intended to 
invoke this rule. 
Nothing in this rule, however, suggests that once the documents 
to be integrated together are identified, parol is admissible to vary 
their unambiguous terms. Bullfrog Marina holds that once documents to 
be integrated together are identified, breach of the provisions of one 
may be considered breach of the over-all agreement; it does not hold 
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that as a result of the integration, the unambiguous terms of both 
agreements may be transformed into something which appears in neitl 
agreement. Bullfrog Marina does not create a rule that the terms c 
an unambiguous integration are variable by parole (whether one doci 
ment or many are involved). See Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. , v. Nju 
sen, 672 P.2d 746, 750 (Utah, 1983). 
In the present case, whether the subject transactions - the Sc 
of a limited partnership interest, the sale of the ranch, and the 
option on the ranch - are considered separately or together creates 
ambiguity in their provisions as to consideration, or any other mai 
ter. Taken together, they do not cease to be sales of assets with 
option and become a secured loan. See Transcript, Vol. I, p. Ill 
(testimony of Frank Allen). Parole was not admissible to vary the: 
terms as to consideration to show that, in order to obtain the lim: 
partnership interest and the ranch, appellants had to give not onl] 
the $500,000.00 ($250,000.00 for the limited partnership and 
$250,000.00 for the ranch) recited in the relevant documents, but < 
year option on the ranch as well, or that, to obtain the option, 
Colman need not have paid the $5000.00 recited in it. Bushnell Rec 
Estate, supra; Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc. vs. Salt Lake County, 
supra. 
None of this is altered by the District Court's finding that 1 
sale of the Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 and the granting of an 
option to buy it back in lh years for $650,000.00, "cannot stand 
alone." Finding No. 30. This finding is effectively one that the 
District Court did not understand the wisdom of the land sale and 
option as "integrated." As the District Court expressed it in the 
Memorandum Decision: 
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"The Court finds it was the desire of the defendants to 
effectuate a series of transactions such that they could purchase 
the Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00; on a latter date grant an 
option to the seller to repurchase for $650,000.00; on different 
date to advance $250,000.00 to a limited partnership in exchange 
for a share of the partnership profits for a three year period 
and a permanent project at Carson Sinks to be documented by an 
assignment from the general partner to Archer and Wolfe. Ac-
cordingly different dates were with the approval of Colman so 
used... 
"To give literal effect to such position one would have to 
conclude that the value in 1981 of the Anderson Ranch was little 
more than $250,000.00 with an expectation that it would increase 
in value over the ensuing one and one-half years and that the 
optionee would also regard it as having a 1981 value of 
$250,000.00 and a later value of $650,000.00." 
Since an option is an offer to sell, not an agreement, or even an 
offer, to buy, it has none of the implications suggested by the Dis-
trict Court. In an uncertain market, the price to buy stated in an 
option represents only the worst case price optionee may have to pay 
to force a sale. If the market remains down, optionee is hardly 
prevented from bargaining for a lower price. The price stated in the 
option does not necessarily represent what the optionee believes the 
land will be worth at the end of the option period. It represents 
nothing as far as the optionee is concerned except a sum in excess of 
the potential value of the land. 
In any case, the fact that the court may think a transaction 
clear on its face and openly arrived at unwise or inequitable does not 
create such an ambiguity as allows resort to parol to remake the 
agreement in a form more satisfactory to the court. 
C. The evidence was inadequate to show that a loan was 
intended. 
The District Court's finding that the transactions between appel-
lants and Colman constituted a secured loan contains the gratuitous 
remark that such finding is not crucial to the decision. Finding No. 
31. Presumably, this intends to insulate the ruling, because the 
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finding is improper. In fact, since the heart of the ruling is the 
sale of the limited partnership interest and the ranch were conside 
tion for the option, it is obvious that this finding is essential t 
the ruling. 
The District Court accepted Frank Allen's claim that the "reaJ 
purposes of the transactions were not appellants' tax purposes, but 
Colman's financing purposes. If the tax purposes are credited, the 
limited partnership interests can be consideration only for the 
$250,000.00 recited in the pertinent document, and the ranch can be 
consideration only for the $250,000.00 recited in that document. I 
is only upon the "loan" theory, which regards the tax structure as 
sham, that consideration can be separated from the limited partners 
and land sales to apply to the option. 
It is true that parol may be admitted to show that a conveyanc 
absolute on its face is in fact a secured loan. The evidentiary 
requirements for such a showing, however, are very high. Faced wit 
these requirements, respondent's counsel in post trial memoranda di 
avowed any attempt to make the necessary showing. Plaintiff's Repl 
to Defendants' Post Trial Memorandum, p. 2. In fact, however, such 
showing is crucial to the ruling. 
i. I_n order to show that a conveyance absolute on its face 
should be construed as a mortgage or security instrument, 
the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing. 
An absolute conveyance will be presumed to be what it purports 
its face to be, unless the evidence that it was intended as a secur 
instrument or mortgage is "clear, unequivocal, and satisfactory", o 
"clear, satisfactory, and convincing". Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 9 
942, 947 (Utah, 1933). See also Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2 
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636 (Utah, 1932); Kjar v. Brimley, 27 U.2d 411, P.2d 23 (1972). 
The evidence in support of the District Court's ruling in this 
case was essentially the testimony of Frank Allen. Whether it was 
clear, unequivocal and convincing is discussed below. 
i^- The evidence must show that both grantor and grantee under-
stood that the conveyance was made as security for a debt 
and not as an absolute conveyance. 
It does not suffice to show that one party to an absolute convey-
ance thought, or wished, it a mortgage instead. The evidence must be 
clear and inequivocal that both so perceived it. Corey v. Roberts, 
supra., 25 P.2d at 942; and see Clark v. George, 234 P.2d 844 (Utah, 
1951); Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah, 1959). 
It is perhaps on this point that respondentsf evidence failed 
most resoundingly. Frank Allenfs testimony comes to little more than 
this: that his client, Colman, wanted to obtain a loan of at least 
$500,000.00 secured by the Anderson Ranch (Tr. Vol. I, p. 42, 104, 
112); that appellants refused to make such a loan (Tr. Vol. I, p. 43, 
pp. 109-111); that appellants1 bargaining position was so dominant as 
to allow them to dictate terms (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 95-96); that Allen was 
not privy to any of the negotiations attempting to compromise these 
positions (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 43, 93-95); that eventually he learned that, 
for tax reasons of appellants which he did not understand (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 47), appellants and Colman had agreed that appellants would invest 
$250,000 in a carefully structured limited partnership interest in 
Colmanfs mineral project, and purchase the ranch for $250,000.00 (Tr. 
Vol. I, pp. 4 3-45, 49); that later Colman asked for and was given an 
option to purchase the ranch for up to one year later for $600,000.00 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 59); that he was instructed to prepare documents to 
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these effects, but that he does not know whether any of these instr 
tions came from appellants or only from Colman (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 44-
49, 63); that after he had prepared the documents, Colman sought an 
extended option, for 1% years at $650,000.00, and that appellants 
agreed (Tr. Vol. I, p. 137); that he does not recall anything addi-
tional charged for the extension of the option (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 152 
156); that he had no way of knowing the actual value of the Anderso 
Ranch (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 124-125); that the transactions, taken to-
gether, appeared to him to have the effect, from Colmanfs standpoin 
of a loan of $500,000.00, at 20% simple interest, secured by the 
Anderson Ranch - at least so long as he ignored the very substantia 
value of the royalties part of the limited partnership interest, wh 
simply did not fit into this scheme (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 159-160); and 
that he made no effort to understand the purposes or effects of the 
transactions from the standpoint of appellants (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 94-
95). Allen had no communication of any kind with any party to the 
transactions regarding the $5,000.00 price recited in the option (T 
Vol. II, pp. 154-155). He concluded that, from the standpoint of h 
client, Colman, which was all that mattered to him, the "total tran 
action" was a "loan" of $500,000.00 at 20% simple interest, secured 
the Anderson Ranch, and that the royalties must have been "added 
incentives" (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 159-160); though, in fact, no one eve 
told him any of these things. 
Frank Allenfs testimony does not even purport to establish app 
lants1 purposes in the pertinent documents, beyond commenting that 
appellants refused to make a loan, and had tax purposes which Allen 
did not understand. All Allen knew, or cared about, was that, igno 
ing the limited partnership interest, the transactions taken togeth 
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had the effect, for Colman, of obtaining $500,000 with the prospect of 
regaining the Anderson Ranch upon payment of $650,000.00 at the end of 
18 months. He was unable to recite a single comment by any appellant 
tending to indicate that the tax purposes for which they insisted upon 
the particular transactions were not real and serious, or were in any 
sense illegitimate. Indeed, the views derived by Allen from his 
limited perspective do not even prove that Colman regarded the trans-
actions as a loan. 
Certainly, the view of an advocate for one side of a transaction, 
from a limited perspective that does not include negotiation of any of 
the transaction or recollection of any direct comment about the pur-
pose of the transaction by any party on the other side, that the 
purpose of the transaction corresponds to his clients1 original pur-
pose, despite having been cast in an entirely different form upon 
refusal of the other side to accede to his client's original purpose, 
is not "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" of the fact. The 
District Court's ruling is not insulated from this defect by the 
gratuitous remark written into the conclusions by respondents1 counsel 
and signed by the court that, though a mere preponderance was the 
appropriate standard, the evidence was clear and convincing. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the District Court, in making 
its ruling/ was even advertent of the appropriate standard, or made 
any effort to see that the evidence measured up. 
iii. _In attempting to show that an absolute conveyance was in-
tended as a mortgage or security instrument, the most impor-
tant fact to show is that the parties knew that the amount 
paid for the property was substantially less than its actual 
value at the time. Kjar v. Brimley, supra; Rizo v. McBeth, 
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398 P.2d 209 (Aka., 1965). See also Corey v^ Roberts, 
supra. 
It was of central importance to respondent's case to show tha 
the Anderson Ranch was worth $500,000.00 in Fall 1981 and was so 
perceived by appellants, so as to form the security for a $500,000 
"loan". The testimony indicated the contrary - that Archer, Wolfe 
and Colman believed the Anderson Ranch had a cash value of $250,00( 
in Fall, 1981, the price then paid for it. Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 424-^ 
429, Vol. IV, pp. 639-640, Vol. II, pp. 734-737. 
To counter this evidence, respondent offered an appraisal of 1 
value of the property as $427,240.00 in 1972, prepared by one 
Marcellus Palmer (Exhibit 58, Tr, Vol, IV, p. 646 et seq.). Appel-
lants objected on the ground the bases for the opinion shown in the 
document wer° ^^t oron^rly reve?led (Tr. Vcl. IV, p. 647 et seq.)* 
Upon examination, it appeared that Palmer had included in the apprc 
al, and had not valued separately, assets other than the land, and 
that the highest and best use for which the value was stated was be 
upon an assumption that the property was zoned permissively for de\ 
opment when, in fact, the property was zoned restrictively against 
development (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 709-714). The actual restrictive zor 
of the property was shown by the local zoning map. Exhibit 80, Tr. 
Vol. VII, pp. 1172-1174. 
Appellants objected to the admission of the appraisal on the 
ground it was shown to have been made on an incorrect basis. The 
District Court took admission of the appraisal under advisement, bu 
subsequently made it the basis of a finding that the property was 
worth at least $500,000.00 in 1981, as it had been professionally 
appraised as worth $427,240.00 in 1972. Finding No. 30. 
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This finding was plain error. The appraisal, if it was admis-
sible, was no basis for finding the property to have been worth 
$427,240.00 in 1972, thus worth $500,000.00 in 1981, because it as-
sumed a greater developability of the property than was proven to have 
been true. The indication of the appraisal was that the land was 
necessarily worth far less than $427,240.00 in 1972. This evidence, 
combined with the uncontradicted testimony, showed that the property 
could not have been worth $500,000.00 in 1981, and could not have been 
regarded by the parties as security for a $500,000.00 loan. 
While the findings of the District Court are entitled to respect, 
they may be reversed where clearly in error (Elton v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 28 U.2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (Utah, 1972); First Secur-
ity Bank, N.A. v^ _ Hall, 29 U.2d 24 504 P.2d 995 (Utah 1972)), and this 
should be done where the finding is essential to the overall ruling. 
iv# Parol is admissible only to show the intent of the parties, 
not to vary the terms of the documents. Thomas v. 
Ogden State Bank, supra, 13 P.2d at 639. 
Even if it could be shown that the deeds and Option in this case were 
intended as a mortgage rather than an absolute conveyance, that would 
not have authorized the District Court to strike the $5000.00 con-
sideration term from the option, or to replace it with part of the 
consideration for the limited partnership and land sales agreements. 
III. Colman's "notes" were inadmissible, and their admission was re-
versible error. 
Respondent's Exhibits 54, 55, and 56 were poor photocopies of 
incomplete, unintelligible fragments of "notes" in Colman's handwrit-
ing. No explanation of the condition of the documents was proffered 
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except respondent's counsel's handling of them.— 
No date for the documents was ever shown. The circumstances 
under which they were prepared were never established. Colman coul 
only identify them as possibly fragments of notes of conversations 
with respondent's counsel. Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 945 et seq. No cohere 
reading of the documents was ever established. Id. 
The District Court took under advisement appellants1 objectior 
5 
to admission of these documents—. Tr. Vol. VI, p. 978. No decisic 
was ever rendered on the objection, but the documents were subseque 
ly admitted, and formed a basis for the District Court's disbelief 
the crucial testimony of William Colman. Transcript of Hearing on 
Objections to Findings and Conclusions, July 30, 1986, pp. 52-53. 
Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides as follows: "When 
Counsel removed the originals from Colmanfs office, and delivc 
them to a secretary to copy. No record was made of the origii 
condition of the documents; no check was made to assure that 1 
copies accurately represented the originals; and the original; 
thereafter disappeared. Counsel could not show that portions 
the originals had not been lost or left uncopied, or that the 
documents had not been stapled back together in a form differ* 
from the original. Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 1107-1120, 1144-1161. 
Among the objections was that the documents were required to 1 
produced by the pretrial order, and had not been. While the 
pretrial order was not written, the District Court's understai 
ing of it was the same as appellants' counsels. Tr. Vol. IV, 
695. Respondents' assertion that the documents need not have 
been produced as they were rebuttal was obviously incorrect: 
documents were used on cross-examination. 
Like other crucial evidentiary rulings, the admissibilit; 
the notes was taken under advisement, then the notes were adm 
ted sub rosa and relied upon without any cogent ruling on adm 
sibility being made. The same treatment was accorded the par 
san testimony of respondents' counsel (Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 392 
seq.) which underlies the court's finding on substantial comp 
ance with the terms of the option regarding exercise (Finding 
Nos. 54-56), and the "affidavits" of Colman and Allen (Exhibi 
27 and 28) as positive evidence of the facts recited therein. 
See Tr. Vol. I, p. 89; Findings Nos. 32 and 33. 
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writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, 
an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part 
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it." 
The purpose of this rule, which is identical to the federal rule, 
is to prevent false or misleading impressions which spring from incom-
plete texts. See McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, §56, 3rd ed. 
(1984). 
Where the complete text necessary to an intelligible reading of 
the documents, which is in turn necessary to an appropriate determina-
tion of the identity of the persons speaking therein and the circum-
stances under which the documents were made, is not available, the 
documents should not be admitted. See Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evi-
dence. In such circumstances, the documents cannot give a clear or 
helpful impression. Application of such a rule is particularly apt 
when the facts known about custody of the documents indicate the 
possibility that the condition of the documents may be due to mishand-
ling by counsel who proffers them, or, worse, to partisan editing. 
Where fragmentary documents are improperly admitted, and though 
it cannot be determined what meaning the court drew from them, it is 
clear that they have materially affected the Courtfs view of the 
credibility of a central witness, the error in admission is reversible 
in and of itself.— 
The District Court's findings treat the decision in this case as 
a contest of credibility between Frank Allen and William Colman 
(Compare Findings Nos. 32 and 33), and the "notes", Exhibits 
54, 55, and 56, and Colman1s reaction to them are specifically 
found to denigrate Colman1s credibility. See Finding No. 33. In 
fact, the record reveals that Colmanfs angry reaction to the 
"notes" was based upon the supposition that respondent's counsel 
may have obtained them improperly from counsel respondent had 
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IV. Appellants were entitled to interest on the sums deposited wi1 
the Clerk of the District Court. 
The District Court in this case awarded to respondent interesl 
the sums deposited with the Clerk as payment for the subject prope] 
despite the admitted fact that respondent has had the use and posse 
sion of the premises at all relevant times. Respondent maintains c 
trailer house on the property, and he and his family use it througl 
the year for various recreational purposes. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 223, 
275, 280, 287-291, 295, 297. The property is fenced, with locked 
gates, and posted against trespassing. Respondent maintains the 
fences, and controls the keys to the gates. .Id. , Vol. II, p. 782. 
The basis for the District Court's ruling was the fact that ir 
one year, when respondent used a small portion of the property, to-
gether with leased public lands, for running cattle, he paid appel-
lants part of the profits of this operation. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 291 
294. The following year, when respondent did not propose to run 
cattle, appellants, after inquiring with respondent, leased the sar 
part of the land for this purpose to another. Tr., Vol. II, p. 28' 
Vol. IV, p. 521. Otherwise, appellants have neither occupied or us 
the land. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 782. That is, appellants have receive 
portion of the proceeds of leases for running cattle on a portion c 
the land in two years, while respondent has received a portion of s 
proceeds, and has otherwise had exclusive use and possession of the 
retained to represent Colman. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 685 et seq. 
Unintelligible, unidentifiable fragments, are no more useable 
cross-examination than for establishing facts. Witnesses are 
entitled to review the documents used to cross-examine them 
pieces of the document, rendered unintelligible, possibly by 
partisan editing. 
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land throughout. The value of the ranch for running cattle is a tiny 
fraction of the over-all value of the property. Tr., Vol. II, p. 295, 
Vol. VII, pp. 1216-1217. 
It appears that respondent may have delayed repairs to certain 
present improvements on the land pending the outcome of the litiga-
tion, but the delay was voluntary, and did not diminish respondent's 
on-going occupation and use of the lands. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 290-291. 
Utah has adopted the majority position regarding entitlement to 
interest on the purchase price where the purchaser seeks specific 
performance and an award of lost rents and profits: 
The guiding principle with respect to the calculation 
of the damages incident to the decree of specific perform-
ance . . . is to relate the performance back to the date set 
in the contract. Timely performance of the contract would 
result in the purchaser receiving the rents and profits of 
the land but being denied the use of the purchase money, and 
a purchaser who seeks to recover rents and profits must 
permit an offset for his use of the purchase funds during 
the period that performance was delayed. In an early case 
this court held that a defendant in a situation like the one 
before us should be permitted to offset against the profits 
interest on the entire purchase price. (Heinlen v. Martin, 
(1979) 53 Cal. 321, 232.) This holding is the overwhelming 
weight of authority. [Citations ommitted.] 
Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 430-431 (Utah, 1980) quoting Ellis v. 
Michelis, 32 Cal. Rptr. 415, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 384 P.2d 7 (1963). 
In the present case, respondent does not seek lost rents and 
profits, presumably because respondent has had possession and use of 
the land throughout, and no use of the land has been made by appel-
lants without respondent's consent. In that circumstance, in the 
event respondent were to prevail, there is no reason why appellants 
should not be entitled to interest on the deposited funds, with an 
adjustment for lease payments previously received. 
Otherwise, the Utah rule is the straightforward one stated in 
Pack v. Hull Development Co,, Inc., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah, 1983): "The 
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award of interest in a case such as this depends on who has posses, 
of the property. If the seller has in some way prohibited the buy* 
from taking possession, no interest is allowed on the unpaid balan< 
If, however, the buyer has possession, interest will generally be 
awarded." 667 P.2d 40, citing Blomquist v. Bingham, 652 P.2d 900 
(Utah, 1982); Amoss v^ Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40, 456 P.2d 172 (1969) 
Farnsworth v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571 (1950). It is ad] 
ted that respondent had possession and unfettered use of the prope: 
at all times. He did on it all he would have done had his ownersh. 
been undisputed. Appellants did nothing with the property except 
lease a portion of it with respondent's consent. 
In the circumstances, it was merely vindictive not to award 
intdicoc co app^ j-i.c*xics, witn an appropriate credit for Liic minor si 
received by them from a cattle lease. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The documents in issue in this case are clear and unambiguous 
this is true whether the Court reads them together or apart. The 
testimony about them is uniform that they were entered into in the 
form in which they appear for specific tax purposes of appellants. 
They would not have been entered into in any other form. There is 
evidence that appellants1 tax purposes were insubstantial or in an; 
manner improper: even respondents1 evidence is to the contrary. 
The District Court has entirely discounted and refused to give 
effect to appellants1 purposes in the documents, without explanati< 
or rationale for doing so. To reach its judgment, the District Coi 
has cancelled the consideration stated in the subject Option, and 
substituted therefore the consideration bargained and paid for in 1 
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Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership and Agreement for 
Purchase of Real Property. The judgment alters the subject matter of 
the documents, changes contractual considerations, and destroys the 
legal effects - the tax structure - which all witnesses testify was 
the basis of the transactions. No evidentiary basis for the ruling 
was submitted except parol. Admission of this evidence violated the 
parol evidence rule. 
Even the most nearly applicable exception to the parol evidence 
rule - that for showing that an absolute conveyance was intended as a 
mortgage - permits only a showing of the intent of the parties, not 
variation of the terms of the documents, and requires clear and con-
vincing proof that both sides of the transaction regarded it as a 
security transaction. 
Respondents1 evidence, Frank Allen's testimony, even had it been 
admissible, proceeds from a limited viewpoint and limited opportunity 
to observe, and includes nothing which tends to indicate that appel-
lants1 purposes were other than appear from the face of the documents. 
It was not clear and convincing evidence in support of the District 
Court's ruling. Other crucial elements of proof in respondent's case 
- the evidence of contemporaneous value of the Anderson Ranch, and the 
evidence upon which the District Court chose to disbelieve William 
Colman - were inadmissible, or failed to provide a clear and convinc-
ing basis for the judgment. 
The present is precisely the sort of case for which the parol 
evidence rule was made. It prevents claims by either side of a trans-
action that the benefits to either side exceed what the documents 
provide; or that more can be had for less consideration than is 
stated. 
The evidence here is that any consideration agreed upon for tl 
subject option was never paid, and that the option was withdrawn 
before being exercised. It could not be specifically enforced. 
The judgment in this case is without evidentiary basis, and 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ *—' day of />£<-, ^^.., 19 3^ -. 
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Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed y true and correct copies 
of the foregoing APPELLANTSfBRIEF to: 
Brent Hoggan 
OLSON & HOGAN 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Postage pre-paid in Salt Lake City, Utah, t h i s ^^nA d^Y o f 
JJej?JwJ&>r , 1986. 
i t r i c i a J./Elirman Pal W1 
CERTIFICATE AND AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
OF SOLAR CHEMICAL COMPANY 
THIS CERTIFICATE AND AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is 
effective as of October 15/ 1981, and is executed pursuant 
to the laws of the State of Utan, Title 48, Chapter 2, Utah 
Ccce Annotated, 1953, as amended, and certifies as follows: 
1, Nane of Partnership. The name of the Partnership 
hereoy formed is SOLAR CHEMICAL COMPANY whicn snail herein be 
called "the Partnership". 
2, Character of the Business. The character o-f tne business 
m which the Partnership is to engage is the development of 
technology for extracting sodium and saline minerals from brine 
and salt deposits and to proceed with the extraction, production 
and .Targeting of sodium and sodium salts (the "minerals") located 
on or under tne land located in Churchill County, Nevada (tne 
"Properties"), described on Exhibit A attacnec hereto and by 
this reference made a part hereof, pursuant to tne lease (tne 
"Lease") identified on Exhibit A and held by the General Partner. 
3. Location and Principal Place of Business. The address 
of tne partnership m Utah shall be: 200 American Savings Plaza, 
77 West Second South, Salt Lake City, Utan 34101. The principal 
place of tne Partnership operations snail be at tne Properties. 
4. Names and Residences of Members. The name and place 
of residence of the general partner is: Owanah Oil Corporation, 
a Utan corporation, 200 American Savings Plaza, 77 West Second 
Scutn, Salt Lake City, Utah 34101. The names of the limited 
partners are as follows: 
Maie Address 
Jcr.n D. Archer ("Arcner") Post Office Box 8 031 
Foothill Station 
Salt Lake City, Utan 84108 
Elliott Wolfe ("Wolfe") 250 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utan 34111 
5. Commitment of General Partner's Assets to the Partnersn-p. 
The General Partner dedicates anc commits the Lease to the 
Partnership during its life, and all revenues derived from 
operat-cns on the Property unaer tne Lease snail constitute 
Appellants f 
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Partnership revenues and be subject to distribution as herein 
provided. 
6. Term of the'- Partnership. The Partnership will exist 
for a period of three years from the effective date hereof. 
7. Initial Contributions of Limited Partners. The limited 
partners have contributed, as of the effective date hereof, the 
sum» of $5 0,000.00 in cash, said sum having been contributed by 
John D. Archer under arrangement between the limited partners 
for timing their contributions in accordance with their abilities 
to liquidate assets and free cash. 
8. Additional Contributions Agreed to be Made by Limited 
Partners. The limited partners shall contribute, in addition to 
the initial contribution set forth in the-.next preceding paragraph, 
as follows: $50,000.00 by Archer on or before December 1, 1981; 
$50,000.00 by Wolfe on or before January 4, 1932; $50,000.00 by 
Wolfe on or before February 1, 1982; and $50,000.00 by Wolfe and 
Archer collectively on or before March 1, 1932, so that the total 
contributions of the limited partners during the life of the 
Partnership will be $250,000.00. 
9. Share of Profits to be Received by Limited Partners. 
Each limited partner shall receive, as compensation by reason 
of his contribution, five percent (5%) of the net profits of 
the Partnership during its term. "Net Profits" means the excess 
of revenues from partnership operations on the Properties pur-
suant to the Lease over the costs of said operations after taxes. 
Costs of operations shall include interest and service charges 
paid during the life of the Partnership on loans and other 
credit arrangements made by the General Partner, at any time 
before the Partnership formation and during its life, to carry 
on activities directly associated with the acquisition of the 
Lease, the development and investigation of the Properties, and 
technological research. 
10. Right of Limited Partner to Substitute Assignee. 
Any limited partner may substitute an assignee as contributor 
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at the general partner's address above set forth, but such 
substitution shall not relieve the assigning limited partner 
of the obligation to contribute in the event his assignee fails 
to do so. , 
11. Right to Admit Additional Limited Partners. The 
partners may admit additional limited partners if ail agree 
in writing upon the terms of such admission. 
12. Other Incidents of the Relationship. 
(a) No Priority as Between Limited Partners. No 
limited partner shall have priority over the other with respect 
to return of contributions or compensation by way of income 
or otherwise. No limited partner has the right to demand and 
receive property other than cash in return for his contributions. 
(b) Allocations of Expenditures. Expenditures of the 
Partnership shall be allocated for income ta_x purposes under the 
provisions of Section 704 of the Internal Revenue Code as follows: 
(1) Category One Expenses shall be paid from 
the contributions of the limited partners, to the extent 
the contribution of the limited partners are adequate to 
defray them, and the deduction allocated to the limited 
partners solely out of said contributions. "Category One 
Expenses" means all rentals to maintain the Lease after 
the date hereof and during the life of the Partnership 
and all intangible expenses of ditching and diking on 
the Premises. No part of said contributions shall be 
utilized for payment of costs which are required to be 
capitalized for federal income tax purposes including 
but not limited to the cost of acquiring or leasing material 
or equipment used in connection with ditching or diking on 
the Premises, or processing salt, or the cost of any real 
or personal property which has salvage value. 
(2) Category Two Expenses and all Category One 
Expenses above the amount of limited partner contributions 
shall be paid out of funds contributed by the General 
Partner or generated by Partnership operations. "Category 
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Two Expenses" means all expenses other than Category One 
Expenses. 
(3) The Parr.ersnp snail maintain separate cooks 
of account with verifying receipts or other documentation 
for Category One Expenses and for each limited partner 
showing expenditures made out of his account and the Part-
nership shall, at quarterly intervals until the contributions 
have been exhausted, submit to the limited partners reports 
showing use of their contributions. 
(c) Conversion of Net Profits Interest to Royalty Interest. 
Upon termination of tne Partnership as herein provided, the net 
profits interest of the limited partners snail convert to an 
overriding royalty interest to be documented by an assignment 
by tne General Partner to each limited partner of a one-naif 
of one percent overriding royalty, such percentage to be applied 
against the value, before processing, of sodium salts recovered 
from the Properties pursuant to the terms of the Lease. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed tn-.s 
Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership as of the aay 
and year first set forth above. 
GENERAL PARTNER 
OWANAH OIL CORPORATION 
Bvr ' s> s - ^ ~ \ v -J <+^*> 
. ^t/A^'/L 
Elliott Wol:e" 
210 k.. 327 
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STATE 0 ? UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ^ 
On this / £ P ^ d a y of {U&fbalA-^, 1981, personally appeared 
before me William J. Colman, who by me duly sworn did say that 
he is the President of OWANAH OIL CORPORATION, and tnat the within 
and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation 
by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said 
William J. Colman duly acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC / 
Residing at Salt LakeJTity, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY QT SALT LAKE ) 
S~ 
On this /jT^day of (j^^UJb^ , 1981, personally appeared 
before me JOHN D. ARCHER and ELLIOTT WOLFE, the signers of the 
within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC J \ 
Residing at Salt Laka^CjAy, Utah 
j\y L-uij^ u-Lij^ .on Expires: 
l.Vi J><> 
EXHIBIT "A" 
To Letter Agreement dared Octooer 15, 1981 
by and among Owanah Oil Corporation, John D. 
"Archer and Elliott Wolfe 
Lease dazed January 1, 1968, from Southern Pacific 
Corpanv to Paradox Lnuted, er al 
Township 22 North, Range 29 East 
Churcnill County, Nevada 
Section 9- _A11 
Section 17-J" NE 1/4 
Eirj C? DOCUMENT 
n 
COST?ACT FOR THE PURCHASE OE REAL PROPERTY 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and e n t e r e d i n t o t h i s t " • day of 
Novexrher, 1981 , by and between ROYALTY INVESTMENT COMPANY, Belli 
(an undivided 50% interes t ) 
and JOHN D. ARCHER or ELI2A3ETH ARCHER for t hemse lves^ and 
(an undivided 50% interes t ) 
W I T N 2 5 -5~E. T E: ^-^ ' -" 
•• '•' / /
 / J W"£ER-EAS, S e l l e r wishes t o s e l l and Buyers wish /to buy chs V / ' 
following described r ea l property in Cache County, CJtirr: '' 
3 a — d . 7 ? • *^u The- n o r t h e a s t cuarter" or one nc r theasc 
c h a r t e r ; the* south, h a i r of the no r thea s t q u a r t s r r the 
sou theas t c i a r t s r of the nor thwest q u a r t e r ; the east. 
ha i r of the sou theas t c h a r t e r ; the northwest q u a r t e r of 
the scu thves t .Ttar ts r of Sect ion 25; the north ha l f of 
the northwest, q u a r t e r ; the southwest q u a r t e r of the 
sou theas t qua r t e r ' of Sect ion 25; the no r theas t q u a r t e r 
of the n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r ; the n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of the 
sou theas t q u a r t e r ; the scu thves t q u a r t e r of the s o u t h e a s t 
q u a r t e r ; the south ha i r of the southwest q u a r t e r or 
Section 24; the sou theas t q u a r t e r of the sou theas t 
q u a r t e r ' o f Sect ion 23; in Township 10 North/ Range 3 
East , S a l t LaJ<a- 3ase and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; 
the southeast , q u a r t e r oh the southwest q u a r t e r ; the 
scu thves t q u a r t e r of the s o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r ; and the-
r c r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of the sou theas t q u a r t e r of Sec t ion IP 
Tcvr.ship 10 North., Range 4 Ea3t, S a i t Lax a 3ase and 
Meridian, o c n t a i l i n g 330.14 acres , , t o r e or l e s s . 
P a r c e i 2: The west hair" or the sou theas t q u a r t e r and. 
Township 10 North, Range 3 Eas t , S a i t Laxe 3ase and 
Meridian, con ta in ing 150 a c r e s , note or ! a s 3 . 
Parcel 3: The n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r ; the sou theas t q u a r t e r 
or tne northwest cuar tar ' ; the no r tneas t r u a r t a r of the 
southwest qrar tar ;* the- northwest quar te r of the scutn— 
e a s t q u a r t e r of" Sect ion 13, the e a s t hair or the 
n o r t h e a s t q r a r t e r ; and the north naif of the sou theas t 
q u a r t e r of Section 30, in Township 10 North, Range 4 
East or the S a i t Laxa 3ase and Meridian. Aiso the 
Southwest q u a r t e r of Sec t ion 25, and the Southwest q r a r t e r 
or the Northwest q u a r t e r of 5<*<z- IS, Township LJ South, } 
Range 2 East , Sa i t Laxa Base and Merioiar . - • """ 
Paroei 4 : The ^<2St hair ' of the n o r t h e a s t c u a r t e r ; 
the n o r t h e a s t c u a r t e r or the rcrtthv^sc cuar tar* and th^ 
sou theas t q r a r t a r of the southwest cua r t a r ; of Section 
20. Townsmp 10 Ncrt-t,- Ranee 4 East , Sal t Laxa Base 
Containing 13 4G.14 ac r e s , t o r e : r l e s s , suhjec t to 
r : c i j t ing r i r n t s of wav. 
waner r i g .it 3 pe r t a in ing to 
: e r t v . 
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transaction at this time but to effect it on January 4, 1952. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises znd the 
mutual promises herein set forth, it is agreed by and between 
the parties as follows: 
1. The Buyers will pay the Seller $100.00 upon the execution 
of this instrument. 
r 
2. On January 4, 1982, 3uyers will pay co Seller in cash 
the sum of $250,000.00. 
3. On receipt of the $250,000.00 as in the next preceding 
paragraph provided, Seller will execute and deliver to Buyers a 
deed by which it conveys the Ranch to 3uyers and warrants that 
it has made no transfer of any interest in the Ranch or encumbered 
it in any manner except as is reflected by the records of the 
Cache County Recorder. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this instrument 
the day and year first above written. 
SELLER: 
ROYALTY INVESTMENT COMPANY 
3^ 
William J. Colman, Presiden: 
BUYERS: 
AlA 
/ Joan D. Archer 
Elizabeth Archer 
CiP^-4't 
Elliott Wolfe, Trustee oi zhe 
Elliott Wolfe Trust Number 701 
OPTION TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY 
I EXHIBIT 
! -ik-
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH B. ARCHER, for themselves 
and for the ELIZABETH DALY ARCHER TRUST, and HUBERT WOLFE, 
JUDY W. WOLFE and ELLIOTT WOLFE, Trustees for ELLIOTT WOLFE 
TRUST Number 701; "Optionors", of Salt Lake City, Utah, in 
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) 
and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged, hereby grant to WILLIAM J, COLMAN, 
"Optionee", of Park City, Utah, an option to purchase the 
real property (the "Property") described as follows: 
Parcel 1: The northeast quarter of the northeast 
quarter; the south half of the northeast quarter; the 
southeast quarter of the northwest quarter; the east 
half of the southeast quarter; the northwest quarter of 
the southwest quarter of Section 26; the north half of 
the northwest quarter; the southwest quarter of the 
southeast quarter of Section 25; the northeast quarter 
of the northeast quarter; the northeast quarter of the 
southeast quarter; the southwest quarter of the southeast 
quarter; the south half of the southwest quarter of 
Section 24; the southeast quarter of the southeast 
quarter'of Section 23; in Township 10 North, Range 3 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,- Lots 2, 3 and 4;' 
the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter; the 
southwest quarter of the southeast quarter; and the-
northeast- quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 19, 
Township 10 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 880.L4 acres, mora or less. 
Parcel 2: The west half of the southeast quarter and 
tne east half of the southwest quarter of Section 26, 
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 160 acres, more or less. 
Parcel 3: The northeast quarter; the southeast quarter 
or tne northwest quarter; the northeast quarter of the 
southwest quarter;- the northwest quarter of the south-
east quarter of Section 19, the east half of the 
northeast quarter; and the north half of the southeast 
quarter of Section 30, in Township 10 North, Range 4 
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Also the 
Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the Southwest quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of Sec. 26, Township 10 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 4: The West half of the northeast quarter; 
tne northeast quarter of the northwest quarter; and the 
southeast quarter of the southwest quarter; of Section 
30. Township 10 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. 
Containing 1340.14 acres, mora or less, subject to 
existing rights of way. 
Together with all water rights pertaining to the 
above property. 
BOOK 3 1 0 PACE 1 5 1 
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on the following terms and conditions 
1. This Option must be exercised, if at all, on or before 
July 2, 1983. 
2. The price to be paid for the Property if the Option 
is exercised shall be Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($650,000.00) payable in cash at tne time the Option is 
exercised. 
3. The Optionee ma/ exercise this Option by delivering 
to either of tne Optionors at his address set forth below a 
notice in the following language 
I hereby exercise the Option granted me 
under the terms of the Option instrument 
of March 1, 1902. 
or language otherwise expressing his intent to exercise accom-
panied by a cashier's or certiried check in the amount of 
$650,000.00. 
4. Immediately upon receipt of the notice ard check in 
accordance with the provision-, of the next preceding paragraph, 
the Optionors shall execute and deliver to the Optionee a 
Quit-Clam Deed conveying the Property to the Optionee. 
5. During the life of tne Option, the Optionors will 
transfer no interest in the Property and will in no way encumber 
it or voluntarily subject it to any lien and will pay all taxes 
and assessments against the Property betore the same become 
delinquent. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Optionors have executed this 
instrument this day of March, 1982. 
I & <dL~ <2~ Johrt D. Archer 
P, 0. Box 8031 * ^ 
.Foothill Station 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
/Elizabeth B. Archer 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Hubert Wolfe 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BOOK 3 1 0 PACE 1 5 2 
- 3 -
Judy W. Wolfe 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
, /'Orb*// 
Elliott Wolfe 
250 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
On this Ic*f day of .March, 1982, personally appeared 
before me JOHN D. ARCHER, ELIZABETH B. ARCHER, HUBERT WOLFE, 
JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT WOLFE, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
-y 
u^y¥ <S-' sZ&'S^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
600K 3 1 0 PACE 1 5 3 
EXHIBIT "B" 
The following described real property located and 
situated in the County of Cache, State of Utah: 
Parcel 1: The northeast quarter of the northeast quarter; 
the south half of the northeast quarter, the southeast 
quarter of the northwest quarter; the east half of the 
southeast quarter, the northwest quarter of the southwest 
quarter of Section 26; the north half of the northwest 
quarter; the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of 
Section 25; the nortneast quarter of the northeast quarter; 
the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter; the southwest 
quarter of the southeast quarter; the south half of the 
southwest quarter of Section 24; the southeast quarter of the 
southeast quarter of Section 23; in Towr*snip 10 North, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; the 
southeast quarter of the southwest quarter; the southwest 
quarter of the southeast quarter, and the northeast quarter 
of the southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 10 North, 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 880,14 
acres, more or less. 
Parcel 2: The west half of the southeast quarter and the 
east naif of the southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 10 
North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 
160 acres, more or less. 
Parcel 3: The northeast quarter; the southeast quarter of 
the northwest quarter; the northeast quarter of the southwest 
quarter; the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of 
Section 19, the east half of the northeast quarter; and the 
,nor^i tulf, of the ioutheatt quarter of Section 30, in 
tovnihip 'lO'North, Range 4 Eatt of the Sett Lake Base and 
Meridian.*' Also the Southwett quarter of Section 25, and the 
Southwest guarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26, 
Township 10 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Parcel 4: The West half of the northeast quarter; the 
northeast quarter of the northwest quarter; and the southeast 
quarter of the southwest quarter; or Section 30, Township 10 
North, Range <• cadt, Salt Lake Bsae and Meridian. 
Containing 1840.14 acres, more or less, subject to existing 
rights of way. 
Together with all water rights pertaining to the above 
property. 
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78-25-16. Parol evidence of contents of writings — When 
admissible. 
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the 
writing itself, except in the following cases: 
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof 
of the loss or destruction must first be made. 
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom 
the evidence is offered and he fails to produce it after reasonable notice. 
(3) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of 
a public officer. 
(4) When the original has been recorded, and the record or a certi-
fied copy thereof is made evidence by this code or other statute. 
(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other docu-
ments which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, 
and the evidence sought from them is only the general result of the 
whole. 
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a profession or 
calling, or any department or agency of government, in the regular course 
of business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, 
entry, print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, 
occurence or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or 
all of the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic, 
photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, or other pro-
cess which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so repro-
ducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of 
business unless its preservation is required by law; and such reproduction, 
when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original 
itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether the original is in 
existence or not, an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is like-
wise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and 
available for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a re-
produced record, enlargement or facsimile, does not preclude admission of 
the original. 
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3) and (4), a copy of the original, 
or of the record, must be produced; in those mentioned in subdivisions (1) 
and (2), either a copy or oral evidence of the contents. 
Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded 
Statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a 
party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification. 
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification 
as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, 
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming 
with the requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of Witness With Knowledge. Testimony that a matter is 
what it is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the 
genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for 
purposes of the litigation. 
(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by the trier of 
fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenti-
cated. 
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in 
conjunction with circumstances. 
(5) Voice Identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard 
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, 
by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances 
connecting it with the alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conservations, by evidence 
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone 
company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, 
circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering 
to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a 
place of business and the conversation related to business reasonably 
transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public Records or Reports. Evidence tha t a writing authorized by 
law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or 
a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any 
form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient Documenis or Data Compilation. Evidence that a document 
or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no 
suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it. if 
authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more 
at the time it is offered. 
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system used to 
produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an 
accurate result. 
(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method of authentica-
tion or identification provided by court rule or statute of this state. 
